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Abstract 
This paper compares the way human errors and violations were described in two 
series of accident reports, made before and after the introduction of the 1994 
French Air Force Human Factors (HF) Safety Plan (1992-93 versus 1998-2002). 
The plan aimed at reducing the accident rate by installing a better safety culture 
with the introduction of multiple incentives, namely a voluntary reporting system 
and extensive Human Factors education programmes including CRM courses for 
all pilots, safety officers, and accident investigators. The paper analyses the 
conclusion sections of 70 accident investigations (35 before and 35 after the 
introduction of the plan), categorising coding the text from these conclusions to 
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get equivalent semantic categories describing errors, violations and their attributed 
causes. The main results show a wider systemic consideration of factors in the 
reports and a more standardised phrasing of errors after the HF plan was 
introduced. The use of the term 'violation' is absent in both periods, replaced by 
several related, less emotive words (incorrect procedure, deviance, etc) – but 
which are also much more underspecified, thereby creating the potential for 
loopholes in the accurate description of causes contributing to the accidents and in 
proposing their associated solutions. 
Introduction: general context 
In the early 90s, the accident rate in international civil aviation had reached a 
plateau of 10-6 accidents per departures. At the same time, the figure for military 
aviation in Western Air forces was running two orders of magnitude behind, with 
a rate of accident close to 0.5*10-4 per flight hours. This was the case of France. 
An annual average of 25 accidents or severe incidents was the standard for the 
French Air force in the 80's2. Not surprisingly, considering the usual figures in 
civil aviation (Boeing stat summary, 2003), human errors causes were also cited 
as the primary cause in about 70% of these Air Force military accidents (see 
figure 1). 
In the early 90s in the French Air Force, most safety directives and 
organizational aspects were issued in the 70s. At that time, safety officers were 
appointed in each squadron. The flight safety bureau was positioned in the central 
Air Force headquarters. This bureau was placed directly under the authority of a 
Major General (four stars), second in command of the Air Force. The safety 
bureau was in charge of a series of continuous actions like educating the 
corresponding officers or editing a safety bulletin and, last but not least, the 
bureau was in charge of all accident investigations. The role of the bureau in 
accidents was threefold: (i) initiating the after accident process, appointing experts 
to the inquiry board; (ii) making provisional safety decisions such as a 'temporary 
grounding the fleet' if required; (iii) and once the report was available, closing the 
process and initiating follow up technical and /or disciplinary actions. 
Despite the apparent value of this safety organization and despite the 
continuous safety improvements observed in the past decades, the pressure to 
1 Civil aviation uses a denominator for accident statistics based on airport departures (instead of flight 
hours) in order to neutralize long cruise periods where the risk of accident is moderate. Such a 
correction is needed less in the military, because most military flights are much shorter (often 
below one hour for fighters in the 80s). 
2 Military aircraft accidents are defined as events where the consequences are either substantial 
damage on the aircraft or death or serious injury. Severe incidents correspond to near accidents. 
Accidents involving paratroopers and military flying clubs using gliders and aircraft are included 
in the accident analysis. 
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vastly improve military aviation safety grew in the early 90s. Three factors 
initiated a profound change in the attitude of the Air Force Commanders' 
regarding safety. 
Comparative analysis of the 
impact in accident analysis and 
safety before and after the plan 
Figure 1 Evolution of the raw number of accidents in the French Military 
Air Force (excluding military flying club activity) 
• The first factor was a direct consequence of a series of political and 
technical revolutions. It was decided in the late 80s to drastically reduce the 
composition of the French fleet from 560 fighters to about 380 within a 
period of 20 years. This reduction followed a new political deal in Western 
Europe and in the NATO forces, and was associated with a significant 
modernization of the fleet. The 'numerous low cost' old generation fighters 
(Jaguars, Mirage III and Mirage IV) were replaced with the new high 
performance Mirage 2000 generation, and more recently to the Rafale. Not 
only was the fleet was reduced by one third, but the new fighters costed at 
least three times the price of a fighter of the old generation. These reasons 
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made any new hull loss even less acceptable and reinforced the rapid need 
for better safety. 
• The second factor echoed a series of new ideas coming from the human 
factors community. During the 80s, major psychological advances were 
being made worldwide in aviation safety management. This human factors 
`upgrade' proceeded in two major steps. Firstly, in the early 80s, came 
Charles Billings's NASA team and other well known associated fellows, 
like Bob Helmreich and Earl Wiener (for example, see Foushee, 1984 or 
Wiener, Kanki and Helmreich, 1993 for an oerview of this period). The 
impact of this group of people on Aviation Human Factors was tremendous. 
With the introduction of the CRM (Crew Resource Management) concept 
they shifted the focus of Human Factors towards pilot behaviour and 
training issues. Human Factors issues then expanded from a group of 
enlightened designers, to thousands of people in the airline business all 
around the world. The second revolution came in the late 80s with Jim 
Reason's ideas on human error, which had a considerable impact on 
aviation safety. Reason and other contributors (Reason, 1990, 1997; 
Westrum, 1995; Maurino et al, 1995) introduced the central paradigm of a 
systemic approach to safety, stressing the role of accident precursors 
through latent organizational failures, corporate and national cultures and 
beliefs. This came with the support of cognitive engineering in design 
offices, pushing engineers to go beyond errors and to reconsider automation 
paradigms, shifting from quantitative evaluation concepts (workload) to 
more qualitative cognitive concepts (such as situation awareness –Billings, 
1997, Woods et al, 1994, Sarter and Amalberti, 2001). Investigators were 
educated in parallel to pilots and rapidly brought these concepts into the 
national bureaus for air accident investigation all around the world. It was 
hard for military aviation to evade these new concepts during investigations. 
• The third factor was the consequence of a growing need for sky sharing 
with civil aviation and ATC and also the Justice Department's evolution to 
be more inclined to question and consider wider consequences of military 
accidents. These moves pushed the Air Force Commanders to demand their 
military training schools to prepare military pilots to hold a civil pilot 
professional flight licenses. This, the human factors training in JAR FCL 
and JAR OPS were logically included in this alignment with the civil 
diplomas. 
Given these circumstances, the Air Force Commander launched a Priority Plan 
for Aviation Safety in late 1993 to improve safety and better consider the system-
wide approach to human factors. The plan aimed at reducing the military accident 
rate by an order of magnitude within a period of ten years. Four steps for 
improvement were considered to be the first priorities: 
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1. To develop a basic and systematic HF education for all military pilots 
(including accident investigators) aligned with the JAA civil requirements 
for the ATPL. 
2. To develop CRM courses for all squadrons and all types of aircraft, 
3. To develop a voluntary and anonymous reporting system on HF causes of 
incidents and near accidents. 
4. To suggest concepts, methods and training curricula to develop stress 
coping strategies for pilots. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section one describes the objectives of 
the study and the expected changes. Section two sets out the methods used. 
Section three presents the main results and section four discusses the possible 
factors that have limited the impact of the plan on accident investigator's 
capability to code human failures in accident reports. 
Human factors education curricula and related hypotheses on expected 
changes 
Objective of the study 
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of an intensive Human Factors 
education program for accident investigators on their capacity to better search and 
explain human-related factors and causes in accidents. 
The purpose of this study is not to analyze the real impact of the HF plan on the 
accident rate. Safety improvement may seem important when considering raw data 
(the reduction in the accident rate was by an order of magnitude of 2.2 within this 
period of five years). However, such a conclusion requires a careful discussion of 
the side-effects of and attribution of progresses in the HF plan. For example, 
during the same period of time, the Mirage 2000 progressively replaced the old 
generation of Jaguar with a much better and safer technology (fly-by-wire design) 
and the total flight hours in the Air force was also significantly reduced. 
To sum up, this study focuses on the change in attributing causality after HF 
education and not at all on the global effect of the HF aviation plan on accident 
rate. 
HF course curricula 
Until 1993, before the HF plan there was no mandatory HF education of military 
pilots and accident investigators. 
After 1993, after the HF plan was implemented, the Air Force commander 
imposed three training requirements: 
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• The first training requirement was composed of two modules taught by 
IFSA (Institut Francais de Securite Aerienne) on the specification of 
IMASSA. The courses were mandatory for all officers belonging to the 
central safety bureau, and all military regional safety officers (from among 
them was systematically chosen the chief investigator of Boards of Inquiry). 
• The first course was a one week Basic Human factors course. It included 
specific developments on human limitations and performance; 
perception; reasoning; attention and vigilance; crew rest; stress and 
human error; detection and recuperation and global management of risk. 
A specific chapter was devoted to violations, introducing Jim Reason's 
classification of routine versus exceptional violations, and giving 
examples of the paradoxical need for some violations to achieve some of 
the assigned tasks. 
• The second course was a two week course on accident investigation (with a 
significant contribution on human factors causes). The course gave 
extensive information on human error causality, emphasising the 
difference between the person versus the system approach. The 
Rasmussen' SRK model (1987), Reason's Swiss Cheese model (1990) 
and Hollnagel's phenotype of error modelling (1993) were the reference 
models for most of these lessons. A significant part of the course was 
also devoted to improving safety culture (Westrum, 1995) and to the 
concepts of situation awareness, and its application to automation-
induced accidents (Sarter and Woods, 1992, 1995). 
• The second training requirement was comprised of CRM at the squadron 
level. The deployment of CRM into squadrons started in 1993 and was 
completed in 1998. This interactive operational course included chapters on 
teamwork; authority and leadership; communication; human error; fatigue 
and stress management, and ended with some case-based accident analyses. 
All regional safety officers, and potential chief investigators received this 
training during the period 1993-1998. 
• The third and last training requirement for HF training was accomplished 
through the annual recurrent training on HF problems and via the new 
human factors voluntary reporting system introduced in 1995 (Vortex 
system), This led to multiple feedback from squadrons. 
From this process, two outcomes were expected to be seen in the accident files 
after the plan: first a more standardized academic-oriented analysis and phrasing 
of human error with more explicit reference to errors types, and secondly a 
growing consideration for systemic issues, looking beyond error to latent failures 
in the organization. 
Note that the analysis of the impact of the HF education of investigators has 
already been undertaken, for example in selected US and Canadian aviation 
accident reports between 1996 and 2002/2003 (Holloway and Johnson, 2004; 
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Johnson and Holloway, 2004). The results show that the majority of high 
consequence accidents were attributed to human error. A large number of reports 
also mentioned wider systemic issues, including the managerial and regulatory 
context of aviation operations. These wider issues are more likely to appear as 
contributory rather than primary causes in accident reports. Apart from these 
results, it is important to note that Johnson (2003) also pointed to considerable 
controversy over this systemic view of failure which could result in inverting the 
whole paradigm of accident investigation, absolving the responsibility of front line 
actors to the detriment of the organization, regulators and managers (see also 
Johnson and Holloway, 2003). It can also be difficult to identify precisely which 
factors play a significant role in the latent causes of an accident or incident. It was 
therefore also of interest in this study to evaluate how much difference education 
had made the move to attributing systemic causality. 
Method 
General principles 
The method is based on a comparison of a set of accident investigation files before 
and after the launch of the 1994 Air Force plan for aviation safety. 
The BEFORE PLAN PERIOD is made up of all of the 35 accidents files which 
occurred in the last two years before the plan (1992 and 1993). 
The AFTER PLAN PERIOD is made of an equivalent sample of 35 files. We 
considered a period starting in 1998, five years after the launch of the plan. To get 
an equivalent series of 35 accidents compared to the BEFORE period, we had to 
consider a much longer period of time, covering all files between 1998 and mid 
2002. 
Table 1 Characteristics of accidents files considered in the two 
chronological series. All files have been considered without 
exclusion. The category 'miscellaneous' covers accidents 
involving paratroopers, gliders and propeller-driven aircraft 
(Numbers in brackets correspond to accidents were Human 
factors is cited as a primary cause) 
Aircraft Type BEFORE AFTER 
Fighters 17 (12) 17 (14) 
Transport aircraft 2 (1)  
Training aircraft 2(1) 7(1) 
Helicopters 5(5) 2(2) 
Miscellaneous 9(6) 9(8) 
TOTAL 35 35 
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The accident files from the two periods were considered in the chronological 
order of occurrence, without any filtering or exclusion process. Therefore, the 
accidents of training aircraft, paratroopers, military gliders and propeller-driven 
aircraft are included in the list and grouped in the miscellaneous category. 
The distribution of the types of aircraft involved in the accidents is given in 
table 1. 
The strict pairing of the types of aircraft in the two sets of accidents –before 
and after the implementation of the plan – is not an object of comparison for two 
reasons: 
• Firstly, the goal of the study was not to compare the raw data, but merely to 
compare the attribution of causal factors and the phraseology on human 
error used in the reporting of these adverse events. We can make a 
reasonable hypothesis that such changes, if they exist, are primarily 
dependent upon the investigator and not on the type of aircraft. 
• Secondly, the study gives priority not to aircraft type but to accidents where 
human factors are cited as the primary cause (and where human error or 
violations were explicitly suspected). 
Detailed methods 
The accident file as basic material The basic material used for all analysis was 
the accident file. Until 2003, and the creation of the Bureau Enquetes Accident 
Defense, the investigation board was composed of four people: the Chair, always a 
pilot (a regional chief safety officer) and three assessors: a pilot from the Air 
Force base of the damaged aeroplane; a mechanic with knowledgeable of that 
aeroplane, and a flight surgeon. Each of the three assessors wrote a sub report, 
then the chair wrote a cover report ended by a one page executive summary of the 
circumstances and presumed causes. This was expected to be delivered with a 
provisional conclusion within three to six months. This report was then 
transmitted through the hierarchy to get additional comments and 
recommendations (squadron commander, Air Force base commander, Medical 
headquarters – the IMASSA was in charge of this process – AF safety bureau, and 
finally the Air Force Major General was in charge of deciding the corrective 
actions and sanctions (if needed). Usually one year was needed to close an 
accident report. 
All accident reports considered in this analysis come from the library of 
IMASSA. All files are closed. They have almost the same structure in terms of 
content even though they were all made before the initiation of the new bureau 
enquetes accident defense (BEAD). 
The procedure for extracting relevant information for the analysis consisted of 
two steps. 
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First step: global reading and analysis A careful reading of each accident file by 
two of the authors of this paper was undertaken. The readers compared 
conclusions. 
Table 2 Principle of the analysis of executive summary: coding 
categories and related number of occurrences (in brackets) 
1. Context (117) 1. Factual context description 
2.1 Explicit abnormal action expressed in 
mission and a/c procedures terms (104) 
2.2 Explicit human deficiency expressed in 
crew-centred terms (69) 
2.3 Explicit patent human error mechanism 
(65) 
2.4 Explicit latent factors / systemic cause 
(49) 
3.1 Explicit voluntary non standard 
procedure or action (40) 
3.2 Explicit latent factors / systemic causes 
(9) 
4.1 Explicit failure immediately 
consequential for flight (58) 
4.2 Explicit latent factors / systemic causes 
(29) 
5.1 Explicit failure immediately 
consequential for flight (24) 
5.2 Explicit latent factors / systemic causes 
(2) 
6. All statements unrelated to previous 
categories (27) 
This reading provided: 
• A global understanding of the accident synopsis, as well as a list of 
hypothesis and facts, as noted by investigators 
• A classification of the accidents depending upon their primary causes: (i) 
technical and environmental failure–related accident (ii) human error-
related accident, and (iii) violation-related accident. Although the 
distinction technical/environmental causes versus human causes is generally 
explicit in reports. The distinction between human error versus violation 
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expressions used for describing the human failures. The criteria for 
classifying a file in the violation group were that there were explicit 
mentions in the report that one or many actors involved into the accident 
chain voluntarily made a deviation from standard operating procedures. 
• A classification of accident responsibility (front line actors; Air Force base 
support; Military operations and regulations; Training school and training 
courses; Maintenance; Military Authorities; Manufacturers) as they 
appeared in the final conclusion signed by military authorities 
Table 3 Example: segmentation and recoding of one executive summary 
(excerpt). From raw data (categorisation of the executive 
summary) to recoded causes (type of causes, patent versus latent 
associated factors) 
Raw material Expressions (categorisation Coding category 
Phrasing in the executive of the summary) 
s u m m a r y  ( e x c e r p t )   
. . . / . . .The f ighter  pi lot  
stationed in the middle east 
was preoccupied from start 
with a heating failure in the 
cockpit and made a series 
of negligence in managing 
the flight parameters. 
The pilot made unfruitful 
tentative to control the 
heating system. He was 
probably head down for 
seconds. 
.../...The a/c lost altitude 
and crashed in  a  
inhospitable region 5 
minutes after T/0.../... 
It is the second accident 
with the same cause on the 
same a/c type .../... 
El  :  The f ighter  pi lot  
stationed in the middle east 
E2 : (The pilot) was 
preoccupied from start with a 
heating failure in the cockpit 
E3: (The pilot) made a series 
of negligence in managing the 
flight parameters. 
E4: The pilot made unfruitful 
tentat ive to  control  the  
heating system. 
E5: (The pilot) was probably 
head down for seconds 
E4: The a/c lost altitude and 
crashed in a inhospitable 
region 5 minutes after T/O 
E7: It is the second accident 
with the same cause on the 
same a/c type 
Cat 1 (factual context 
description) 
Cat 2.2 (Human centered 
abnormal situation) 
Cat 2.3 (explicit patent human 
error mechanism) (at this stage, 
there is no intention mentioned, 
therefore the item is classified 
in the error category) 
Cat 2.1 (explicit abnormal 
action expressed in mission and 
a/c procedures terms) 
Cat 2.2 
Cat 1 
Cat 2.4 (latent factor) 
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Second step: a detailed coding of the executive summary A one page executive 
summary closes each report, containing a brief synopsis of the event, listing 
plausible causes and recommended actions. 
The executive summary of each accident file was recoded into six generic 
categories of accident causes with the associated expressions describing the 
human or technical failure (see tables 2 and 3). For example, the category 
violations-related accidents was subdivided into two subcategories, one describing 
violations at a factual level, and the other describing latent factors associated with 
the violation. 
Results 
Similar distribution of primary causes 
There were an equivalent number of accidents where HF was cited as the primary 
cause (25 from a total of 35 in the two series). The number of accidents where error 
was cited as a primary cause versus a violation was cited as a primary cause was 
also stable (six before the HF plan Versus seven after the plan was implemented). 
Table 4 Categorisation of expressions in the two periods before and after 
the introduction of the HF plan 
Categories of expressions 92-93 98-02 
1. factual context description 59 58 
2.1 explicit abnormal action expressed in mission and 
a/c procedures terms (104) 
41 63 
2.2 explicit human deficiency expressed in crew-
centred terms (69) 
29 40 
2.3 explicit patent human error mechanism (65) 27 38 
2.4 explicit latent factors / systemic cause (49) 17 32 
3.1 explicit voluntary non standard procedure or action 19 21 
(40)   
3.2 explicit latent factors / systemic causes (9) 3 6 
4.1 explicit failure immediately consequential for flight 23 35 
(58)   
4.2 explicit latent factors / systemic causes (29) 5 24 
5.1 explicit failure immediately consequential for flight 18 6 
(24)   
5.2 explicit latent factors / systemic causes (2)  2 
6. all statements unrelated to previous categories (27)  27 
TOTAL 241 325 
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The description of errors and violations changed considerably between the two 
periods 
The number of expressions for errors and violations in the executive summaries in 
the second period was much greater than in the first period (241 expressions in 35 
accidents before the I-IF plan versus 325 expressions in 35 accidents after the plan 
– see table 5). This is true for all categories except the categories regarding the 
factual contextual descriptions and of the environment. The summaries become 
longer, therefore much more detailed. 
Table 5 Comparison of the number of expressions related to latent 
causes 
Raw number of expressions related to latent 
factors 1992-93 1998-02 
Cat 2.4 Latent factors associated to Human error 17 32 
Cat 3.2 Latent factors associated to violations 3 6 
Cat 4.2 Latent factors associated to technical failures 5 24 
Cat 5.2 Latent factors associated to environment 0 2 
TOTAL 25 64  
More systemic causes 
There was a significant change between the two periods with a much more 
consideration of and a wider search for systemic causes, as well as a more 
frequent conclusion concerning responsibility for the accident going beyond the 
front line actors (see tables 6 and 7). 
Table 6 Comparison of responsibility as they appear in the final 
conclusion signed by military authorities 
Classification of accident responsibility as 
they appear in the final conclusion signed by 
military authorities 1992-93 1998-02 
Front line operators 59.7% 44.1% 
Management, military authorities , design of 
operations and procedures 
 
17.7% 
Designers/ manufacturers  2.9% 
Inadequate or failing materials 22.6% 14.7% 
Maintenance  1.5% 
Miscellaneous (specific context, etc.) 17.7% 19.1% 
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Table 7 Summary content analysis of category 2.3. This table shows a 
detailed analysis of expressions associated with category 2.3 of 
the grid (explicit obvious human error mechanisms). There are 
27 expressions in period 1 belonging to this category versus 38 in 
period 2. Note the enrichment of vocabulary in period 2, 
contrasting with the very limited introduction of Reason's 
categories of errors 
Before HF plan ( 25 files, 27 
expressions) 1992-93 
Key expressions to Associated 
express human qualifying 
failure 





Error (6) Perception 
Analysis (2) 
Bad, inappropriate, Appreciation, 
incomplete (6) attention, 
representation, 
time management 
After HF plan (25 files, 38 expressions) 
1998-2002 
Key expressions to Associated 
express human qualifying 
failure 
























Technical wordings such as 'wrong 
action on stick and throttles' 
Miscellaneous (9) 
Technical wordings such as 'wrong 
action on stick and throttles' 
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A different phrasing for human errors 
The description of human errors are more detailed in period two (see table 5). This 
result is true and of similar magnitude for all categories of expressions 
(technically-centred, human-centred, related latent factors). This result proves a 
greater willingness to detail and go beyond simple descriptions of error. 
However, a content analysis of category 2.3 (production and recovery 
mechanisms) shows little improvement between the two periods. The error 
mechanisms evoked in the two lists of expressions remains relatively similar, 
based on simple psychology (see table 7). There are few references to Reason's 
wording of the categories of errors, and almost no reference to recovery 
mechanisms. Two little differences may nevertheless be noted: the first is the 
explicit greater proportional use of the word 'error' in the expressions in the 
second period. The second is the much greater references to psycho-physiological 
states as contributors to the erroneous behaviour. 
It can be concluded that the impact of HF education is effective in the 
investigator's consideration of human error. The investigators say more, 
especially about the physiological and psychological background factors that may 
have contributed to the production of errors. However, the phrasing remains 
simplistic and with little reference to theoretical frameworks. This could be either 
the result of a superficial education or an attempt to avoid 'psycho-babble' and 
stick to an easily understood language for decision makers and end-users (to 
whom the reports are intended in the first place). 
Coding the expressions related to violations 
There is no difference in the number of expressions related to violations in the two 
series (19 expressions in the first period belonging to this category versus 21 in 
the second period). This trend is clearly opposite to the result obtained for human 
error. 
The content analysis of category 3.1 (see table 8) shows two major results. 
Firstly, the word 'violation' is never used, whatever the period. Only equivalent 
terms are cited (i.e. excessive risk, illegal action, unruly behaviour) with scarcely 
an explicit reference to the operator's intention. The classification in this category 
of violation therefore results from additional inferences made by authors based on 
information contained in sections of the accident file. In rare cases (two files), the 
authors asked for confirmation from the original investigators. Secondly, there 
was no significant change between the two periods in the content analysis. 
It can be concluded that the HF education plan has had little or no (visible) 
effect on the phrasing of violations. The explicit use of the term 'violation' still 
remains taboo, probably because of the associated risk of litigation. 
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Table 8 Summary content analysis of category 3.1 about violations. This 
table show a detailed analysis of expressions associated with 
category 3.1 of the grid (explicit voluntary non standard 
procedure or action). There were 19 expressions in period 1 
belonging to this category versus 21 in period 2. There is no 
difference between the two periods 
Before HF plan ( 25 files, 19 After HF plan (25 files, 21 expressions) 
expressions) 1992-93 1998-2002 
















Bank to recover 
Risk taking 
Behaviour  




Illegal (5) Manoeuvre 
Procedure(3) 
Lack of (3) Discipline 
Erroneous (2) Application of 
instructions 
Miscellaneous(4) 
Illegal actions in terms of technical 
procedure i.e. forbidden figure of flight 
Unruly (1) 
Go beyond (1) Acceptable 
boundaries 
Illegal (5) Take off with door 
open 
Escape manoeuvre 






Illegal actions in terms of technical 
procedure, i.e., refuse landing on 
a p p r o p r i a t e  t e r r a i n   
Discussion 
The study presented in this paper focuses on some changes that have occurred 
after the implementation of an Aviation Human Factors Safety Plan in the French 
Air Force. 
There are many aspects to the impact of such a plan. The most immediate and 
obvious approach for evaluation tends to focus on direct and concrete safety data, 
this means the accident and incident rate. However, there are many other long 
term indicators, for example changes in the minds of people and the traceability of 
the acquisition of a safety culture. 
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It was not our purpose, in this paper, to debate the safety figures. Despite the 
raw rate of accidents objectively decreasing after the plan, we decided not to 
emphasize that result because of the multiple co-factors acting upon the accident 
rate. For example, a new generation of fly-by-wire aircraft, stall protected, came 
into service at the time of the human factors plan and had a significant positive 
impact on safety. To be honest, it probably had a higher impact than the HF plan 
itself. 
Our priority was to evaluate the change of mentality and knowledge in the 
minds of investigators, who are in the front line in the safety improvement 
movement. They explain why accidents occur and put emphasis on local or 
systemic causes. These reports are the primary material that triggers and drives the 
changes in the system. 
With this in mind, we may say that the human factors education delivered to 
investigators via the HF plan has had two main impacts. 
• The first one was the significant increase of systemic causes cited as 
accident contributing causes. This result was expected and perfectly reflects 
the literature (Woods and al 1994; Reason, 1997; Johnson, Holloway, 
2003). Two questions arise from this result. First, there is a risk of an 
excessive shift from front line operator responsibility to an increased 
responsibility of the hierarchy, the system, and the legislator. Since the 
systemic responsibility is easy to evoke, but uneasy to prove or argue, the 
very result could be the establishment of unclear responsibility at the end of 
the investigation and therefore here are fewer lessons and less progress than 
may be expected. Although there is the potential for this, this risk does not 
seem to be an obstacle at the present time. The global safety improvement 
shows that the change in balance is beneficial. Second, one can wonder if 
the observed changes mean a change in investigators' mental models or just 
a real change in accident causation (emphasising a greater role on technique 
and management)? The management has changed along with time, as well 
as the investigation technique. Over time supervisory control on operations 
by the chain of command has dramatically improved, thanks to the existence 
of AWACS and satellites. The military system is much more coordinated, 
implying that the accident, when it occurs, inevitably involves the chain of 
command. Should this be confirmed, the change observed in the 
investigation board should better reflect a true change in the manner of 
deployment rather than a change in the minds of investigators and the 
impact of HF education. Although it is not possible to make strong 
assumptions on the causality of these changes, the most probable truth is 
that many factors accumulate and combine to cause this result. 
• The second impact is in the phrasing of human errors. We see a significant 
increase of explicit citations of human errors. Again, the improvement is 
much more quantitative than qualitative. We could consider either that it 
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was the intention of writers to preserve a comprehensive level of language 
for naive readers and decision makers or that they were unable to use 
psychological terms. It is probably a bit both. Then the very question is 
how much a naive phrasing reduces the reader's access to the relevant 
information, models and actions. Speaking about violations using the 
correct psychological references seems even to be a greater problem. 
Intentional deviations from procedures are frequent but explicit mentions 
are taboo. Violations are the most difficult unsafe acts to gather in any 
voluntary reporting system (Marx, 2001). Reporting violations may lay the 
individual open to accusations of negligence or professional misconduct 
even if there was no intention to endanger the system. 
• The result of this potentially high reluctance of professionals to speak a 
comprehensive and clear language about error, and even more about 
violations, is to create the opportunity for ineffective and/or unreliable 
safety lessons from critical accidents. We know from extensive studies in 
Medicine that this point is crucial. The definition of error and adverse 
events remains extremely problematic in medicine and creates unreliable 
databases. Reporting for the same event is quite unreliable in phrasing and 
content (Cullen, 1995; Tamuz, 2004) in frequency (doctors report much less 
than nurses, Lawton, 2002) and the situation is even worse when the 
demanded information is perceived to only feed national databases. This 
instability of phrasing and content is recognized to be counterproductive for 
the acquisition of a safety culture and a learning organization (Sutcliffe, 
2004). 
Conclusion 
The study presented in this paper indicates the quantitative and qualitative impact 
of a human factors plan on investigators' phrasing in accident investigation files. 
Though this study suffers from the limitation of having only focused on 
accident file without contact with the investigators, it shows that the impact of 
such an HF education is clearly limited by cultural barriers and that the intended 
result of building a safe and just culture is not achieved and remains a long term 
objective asking for decades of continuous efforts. 
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